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Abstract 
Previous studies have demonstrated that a multitude of options can lead to choice overload, 
reducing decision quality. Through controlled experiments, we examine sequential choice 
architectures that enable the choice set to remain large while potentially reducing the effect of 
choice overload. A specific tournament-style architecture achieves this goal. An alternate 
architecture in which subjects compare each subset of options to the most preferred option 
encountered thus far fails to improve performance due to the status quo bias. Subject preferences 
over different choice architectures are negatively correlated with performance, suggesting that 
providing choice over architectures might reduce the quality of decisions. 
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I. Introduction 
Many decisions involve large choice sets from which one option must be selected. Financial 
retirement planning and health care insurance selection both present individuals with a seemingly 
limitless number of options. For example, Medicare participants are confronted with numerous 
health insurance and prescription drug plans. Even less-consequential decisions often involve 
large choice sets, including shopping for a car, a cell phone plan, or a box of cereal. Traditional 
economic theory holds that more choice is better as the optimum over a proper subset can never 
be larger than the optimum over the original set. While a rational decision maker benefits from a 
wealth of choice, studies have found that larger choice sets can reduce one’s satisfaction with the 
decision (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), the likelihood of making a decision (Redelmeier and Shafir 
1995, Iyengar and Lepper 2000, Roswarski and Murray 2006), and the quality and optimality of 
the decision (Payne et al. 1993, Tanius et al. 2009, Schram and Sonnemans 2011, Hanoch et al. 
2011, Besedeš et al. 2012a,b, and Heiss et al. 2013).  
One way of dealing with a large choice set is simply to reduce its size. However, such an 
approach clearly has many undesirable consequences, chief among which are ethical concerns 
over paternalism and the reduction in some individuals’ ability to obtain their most preferred 
option. Alternatively, one can ask what tools can assist decision makers while still maintaining a 
plethora of options. Some have suggested a form of “libertarian paternalism” that nudges toward 
a decision while preserving all options (Sunstein and Thaler 2003), such as presenting additional 
options only if an individual requests them (Sethi-Iyengar et al. 2004). The effectiveness of this 
approach relies on an assumption that people who request the additional options are benefitted by 
them, and those who do not are benefitted by the smaller choice set. We examine experimentally 
the ability of different choice architectures to improve decision making. Additionally, as people 
are likely heterogeneous in their decision-making approaches, we examine individuals’ ability to 
identify their most suitable choice architecture. 
Choice architectures we consider reduce a large decision problem into a series of smaller 
ones. Such procedures approach a problem sequentially, eliminating a few options at a time. 
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Sequential elimination techniques have been recommended for managerial decision making 
(Stroh et al. 2008) and patient counseling (Oostendorp et al. 2011), and are enshrined in the rules 
of parliamentary procedure (Robert et al. 2011). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, their 
ability to stimulate optimal decision-making has not been considered. 
The choice set we consider consists of lotteries structured in such a way that choices can 
be objectively ranked independent of personal (idiosyncratic) preferences. This is an advantage 
of the laboratory over the “real world” where decisions cannot be ranked without knowing each 
person’s tastes, risk preferences, and subjective beliefs. For example, examining optimality of 
insurance choices or labor decisions requires strong assumptions about the governing choice set 
and the nature of preferences (Heiss et al. 2013, Iyengar et al. 2006). Our research addresses this 
shortcoming through the use of objective tasks, akin to the approach of Caplin et al. (2011) and 
Besedeš et al. (2012a,b). Our full choice set and the value of each option are clearly defined.1 
We consider three choice architectures. The benchmark simultaneous choice procedure 
involves picking one option among sixteen options considered all at once, a large enough 
number of options where the effects of choice overload have been found (Tanius et al. 2009, 
Hanoch et al. 2011, Besedeš et al. 2012a,b). Additionally, we consider two sequential 
procedures, with subjects considering subsets of the sixteen options over several rounds. In the 
sequential elimination architecture, the decision maker first selects among four randomly-
provided options. Then, the three options that were not selected are eliminated and replaced with 
three new options alongside the previously-selected one. This procedure repeats for a total of 
five rounds, until all sixteen options have been considered. In the sequential tournament 
architecture, the sixteen options are randomly divided into four sets of four options each. In the 
first four rounds, the decision maker selects one option from each of the four smaller sets. In the 
final (fifth) round, the subject selects from among the four previously-selected options. Both 
sequential architectures involve subjects working through five rounds, each with four options, 
                                                            
1 The literature on choice overload has examined both tasks with and without objectively right answers (Schram and 
Sonnemans 2011, Iyengar et al. 2006). On one hand, a subjective task may be harder than an objective one, as it 
requires learning one’s own preferences. On the other hand, an objective task may be more demotivating as a person 
knows that there are “wrong” answers (Iyengar and Lepper 2000). 
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but differ in whether the previously-selected option is carried into the next round (sequential 
elimination) or into the final round (sequential tournament).  
After subjects make decisions under all three choice architectures, we elicit their 
preferences over the three choice architectures. The computer then randomly eliminates one of 
the three architectures and subjects complete another task in the more preferred of the two 
remaining architectures. This allows us to examine whether subject preferences coincide with the 
architecture that leads each to the best decision. 
A rational decision maker who evaluates the expected profit from each option and selects 
the optimal one from each choice set should not be affected by the simultaneous or sequential 
nature of the decision-problem. However, a number of heuristic approaches, including sequential 
rationales (Manzini and Mariotti 2007) and satisficing strategies (Simon 1956, Caplin et al. 
2011), suggest that an option chosen from a larger choice set need not necessarily be chosen 
from a smaller choice set in which it is available. Depending on the heuristics employed, a 
smaller choice set may yield better or worse decisions, on average. When subjects tailor their 
heuristics to the decision problem, smaller choice sets may help by encouraging the adoption of 
better heuristics (Payne et al. 1993). Specifically, a subject susceptible to choice overload may 
benefit from the smaller choice sets inherent in sequential choice. Alternatively, Caplin et al. 
(2011) find that larger choice sets encourage subjects to adopt higher aspiration levels (and thus 
continue search until a better option is found) than do smaller choice sets. Regardless of any 
effects of smaller choice sets, the introduction of sequential choice also itself changes decision 
making (Read and Loewenstein 1995).  
Sequential decisions are subject to a status quo bias, an inertia by which the most recent 
selection is likely to be maintained in the next decision (Agnew et al. 2003, Kool et al. 2010). 
Explanations for the status quo bias include psychological attachment to the previous choice, 
satisficing behavior, decision avoidance, and reduction of cognitive costs. While the sequential 
elimination architecture is perhaps more intuitive, its carryover of the selected option into the 
next decision round may exacerbate the status quo bias, reducing the likelihood of optimal 
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choice. The sequential tournament architecture in which all previously-selected options appear 
together in the final round may mitigate this effect. 
We identify three main results. First, we find that the sequential tournament generates the 
best overall performance. Second, sequential elimination offers no improvement over 
simultaneous choice due to the presence of significant inertia in subjects’ sequential decisions. 
Third, while the sequential tournament generates the best performance, this choice architecture is 
least preferred by subjects. We find evidence of adverse self-sorting, by which a portion of 
subjects select choice architectures that lead them to suboptimal choices. This suggests that 
allowing individuals to select their preferred choice architecture need not lead to improvements 
in decision making. 
II. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Subjects participated in a computerized experiment consisting of four decision tasks. Every 
decision task contained sixteen options and twelve potential states of nature. Options were 
characterized by the possibility of payment of $25 under some states of nature, and zero 
otherwise. After each decision task, a state of nature was randomly drawn from a known 
probability distribution. If the option that the subject selected contained the drawn state of nature, 
the subject earned $25 for that task. Thus, the optimal option was the option for which the prize 
was paid with the greatest probability. The critical feature of this design is that it allows for an 
objective evaluation and ranking of options, independent of subjects’ tastes and risk preferences 
so long as subjects are not satiated in money (Besedeš et al. 2012a,b).  
While each task involved selecting one of sixteen options, the choice architecture, or 
process that governed the selection, varied. Three different choice architectures were employed. 
First, in the simultaneous choice procedure, subjects selected one option from all sixteen 
displayed at once. Figure 1 presents a sample screenshot of this task. To the subjects, the states 
of nature were presented as cards numbered 1 to 12. The likelihood of a particular state was 
reflected in the frequency with which that card type appeared in a deck of 100 cards and 
 presented
of certain
contains 
would ea
randomly
is 3 out o
47 out of
 S
sixteen p
were pre
presented
in its orig
through J
been pres
T
sixteen p
were pre
and one w
 in the “Odd
 cards (state
three Card 1
rn $25 for th
 drawn and 
f 100 and th
 100. 
econd, in the
ossible optio
sented and o
 in round tw
inal positio
 in round th
ented. The 
hird, in the s
ossible optio
sented and o
as selected
Fig
s” column.
s) in an opt
s, five Card
is task if a C
would recei
e likelihood
 sequential 
ns through 
ne was selec
o. When th
n. The optio
ree, and so o
final (fifth ro
equential to
ns through 
ne was selec
, and so on. 
ure 1: Screen
 The sixteen
ion was den
 2s, 4 Card 3
ard 1, Card
ve zero othe
 that Option
elimination
a series of fi
ted. The se
e selected op
n selected in
n through r
und) decisi
urnament a
a series of fi
ted. In the s
By the end 
shot of a Sam
6 
 options wer
oted by a ch
s, and so on
 3, Card 5, 
rwise. Thus
 A results in
 architecture
ve rounds. I
lected option
tion was jo
 round 2 wa
ounds four a
on was the s
rchitecture, 
ve rounds. I
econd roun
of the fourth
ple Simulta
e labeled A
eckmark. In
. A person 
Card 7, Card
, the likeliho
 payment is
, subjects se
n the first ro
, along with
ined by thre
s then prese
nd five unti
ubject’s sel
subjects also
n the first ro
d, Options E
 round, the 
neous Choice
 through P a
 this examp
who selected
 8, or Card 
od of a Car
 3 + 4 + 9 +
lected one o
und, Option
 Options E 
e new optio
nted along w
l all sixteen
ected option
 selected on
und, Option
 through H 
subject had 
 Procedure 
nd the inclu
le, the deck 
 Option A 
11 were 
d 1 being dr
 4 + 1 2 + 1
ption from 
s A through
through G, 
ns, it remain
ith Option
 options had
 for the task
e option fro
s A through
were presen
seen all 16 
sion 
awn 
5 = 
 
 D 
was 
ed 
s H 
 
.  
m 
 D 
ted 
7 
 
options and selected one from each round. These four previously selected options were then 
presented in the fifth round in the same order in which they were selected and the final choice 
was made. The difference between sequential elimination and sequential tournament is that in 
sequential elimination the option selected in one round appears again in the next round, whereas 
in sequential tournament, a selected option does not reappear until the final round.2 
By design, our decision tasks are fairly straightforward, with each option representing a 
binary lottery with some probability. While real-world decisions are more complex, they also do 
not allow for an objective measure of decision quality as subjects differ in tastes and opinions 
regarding relative importance of different attributes. Our design allows us to evaluate and rank 
choices objectively and essentially follows standard economic theory by assuming a well 
behaved utility function that numerically ranks items in the choice set. Despite each option’s 
simplicity, past studies have shown that a majority of people fail to select optimally (Besedeš et 
al. 2012a,b).  
Subjects were first required to complete a task using each of the three choice 
architectures, the order of which was randomized for each subject. Architecture-specific 
instructions were provided just before completing each task and subjects learned their earnings 
from each task at the end of that task.3 Prior to the fourth task, subjects provided a ranking of the 
three architectures which was used to select the choice architecture for the fourth task. This was 
incentivized by having the computer randomly eliminate one of the three choice architectures 
and implement the higher ranked of the two remaining choice architectures for the fourth task. 
This procedure provides incentive for subjects to rank not only their most preferred architecture 
first, but also to take seriously the second and third ranking. Subjects received instruction that it 
is in their best interest to reveal their preferences truthfully as the procedure yielded a 2/3 chance 
of using the choice architecture reported as being most preferred and no chance of using the one 
reported as being least preferred. While subjects experienced the three choice architectures in a 
                                                            
2 In experimental instructions we referred to simultaneous choice as select one, to sequential elimination as keep 
one, and to sequential tournament as send to final. These terms describe what subjects do in each task.  
3 Copies of the instructions are available in the Appendix. 
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random order over the first three tasks, this ranking procedure was always last so that subjects 
could make an informed decision.   
Table 1: Choice Tasks 
Card     PDF     Options 
      1  2  3  4     A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P 
1  15  13  13  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2  14  14  14  12  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
3  12  11  12  9  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
4  11  8  8  14  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
5  10  12  10  11  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
6  9  7  5  10  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
7  7  6  9  5  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
8  6  7  7  8  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
9  5  9  6  7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
10  4  5  9  6  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
11  4  4  4  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
12     3  4  3  3        1  1     1  1  1  1        1  1  1  1  1  1 
States Covered:  8  8  8  6  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  8  6  6  6  6 
    Expected Payoffs:                             
PDF  1  80  75 72 68 63 61 59 57 55 53 50  48  47  45 36 32
PDF  2  80  73 66 65 63 61 59 57 58 56 51  54  44  42 39 35
PDF  3  79  71 68 64 63 60 61 58 57 54 49  53  46  43 38 36
            PDF  4     78  72 69 66 62 67 55 60 52 57 46  53  43  48 41 34
 
To provide four similar, but not identical, choice tasks, the probability distributions were 
altered slightly across decision tasks. The four choice tasks are described in Table 1. The four 
probability distributions, PDF1 through PDF4, have similar probabilities for the most and least 
likely outcomes and nearly identical average probabilities across options (between 56.3 and 
56.4). The black areas in Table 1 represent the states covered by each option. No two options are 
identical either in terms of the states contained, or in terms of expected value under any of the 
PDFs. The optimal option resulted in receiving the prize with approximately an 80% chance 
while the worst option yielded the prize with approximately 34% chance, varying slightly by 
PDF. To further ensure that the choice tasks appeared significantly different to subjects, the order 
of PDFs across tasks, and of options and states within tasks, was randomized. Thus, the subjects 
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faced four similar decision problems, but could not use information about one problem on a 
subsequent one. Notably, while subjects had the ability to provide post-experiment feedback, 
none noted any similarity in the underlying set of options across tasks. 
Prior to the four tasks of interest, subjects reviewed instructions and completed a four-
option four-state task to familiarize them with the computer interface. After selecting among the 
options in a task, subjects were shown a deck of cards reflecting the appropriate PDF.  A subject 
then had the computer turn the cards face down and shuffle the deck, following which she chose 
one card (see Appendix for graphical interface). If the chosen card reflected a state covered by 
the selected option, the subject earned $25 for the task, with the exception of the initial 
familiarization task which provided no payment. 
After the experiment was completed, one of the four tasks was randomly selected for 
payment. Each subject was paid his or her earnings for that task. In addition, subjects were paid a 
$5 participation fee.  The average salient earnings were $17.66 exclusive of the $5 participation 
payment, while the average amount of time spent in the experiment was 26 minutes, of which an 
average of five and a half minutes were spent on instructions and just under nine minutes 
actively making decisions.4 
The experiment was conducted through Vanderbilt University’s eLab, an online lab with 
a pool of more than 70,000 subjects who have expressed a willingness to participate in 
experiments. Consistent with eLab policies, subjects were mailed a check for their earnings in 
this study immediately after participating. eLab recruits subjects into its pool using links from 
partner sites, online advertisements, referrals from other panelists, and links from online search 
results, among other sources. eLab collects information on age, sex, and educational attainment 
from members of its subject pool, allowing us to capture this demographic information without 
collecting it directly during the study. Our subject pool was 51% male with an average age of 48 
years (standard deviation of 16). In terms of educational attainment, 30% of subjects were 
college graduates, 32% had some college, and 38% had no schooling beyond high school.  
                                                            
4 The difference in expected payment between optimal and random choice was approximately $6. When accounting 
for active decision time, this extrapolates to a potential hourly wage of $42.  
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III. Results 
A. Choice Architecture and Quality of Decisions 
We begin with a summary of overall performance on the first three tasks using two different 
measures. The first measure, “Optimal Choice,” is the frequency with which subjects select the 
option that yields the highest likelihood of payment. The second measure reflects how far the 
selected option is from the optimal one. It is equal to the difference between the probability of 
receiving payment under the optimal option and the probability of receiving payment under the 
selected option. We refer to this measure as “Money Left on the Table”5 since it reflects the 
reduction in the probability of payment from suboptimal choice. Across all tasks, subjects select 
optimally 28% of the time and selected options have an average probability of payment that is 14 
percentage points lower than the optimal option. Thus, with $25 at stake, subjects on average 
earn $3.50 (= $25 × 0.14) less than they would with optimal choices.6  
Results across choice architectures are presented in Table 2. The sequential tournament 
leads to a significantly higher frequency of optimal choice than either simultaneous choice or 
sequential elimination (Wilcoxon p=0.011 and 0.029, respectively), while sequential elimination 
and simultaneous choice are not significantly different from each other (p=0.470). Sequential 
tournament also leads to less money left on the table than simultaneous choice (p=0.047), while 
sequential elimination is not significantly different from simultaneous choice (p=0.864). 
Although Table 2 suggests that the three architectures lead to similar amounts of money left on 
the table in the aggregate, there is significant heterogeneity across subjects. In particular, the 
average difference between a subject’s best and worst architecture (in the amount of money left 
on the table) is 0.15. On average, each subject’s best architecture represents a 26% increase in 
expected payment over his or her worst architecture.  
Table 2 also reports the average amount of time spent making decisions in each 
architecture measured in seconds.  In general, subjects spend less time in simultaneous choice 
                                                            
5 We are grateful to David Laibson for suggesting this measure. 
6 The main results are qualitatively unchanged if we use alternative measures of efficiency, such as the ratio of 
payoffs of the chosen and optimal options.  
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than either sequential architecture (Wilcoxon p<0.001). Only ten subjects spend more time in 
simultaneous choice than they do in sequential tournament, and only thirteen spend more time in 
simultaneous choice than sequential elimination. The most time is spent in sequential 
tournament, where performance is best. However, the difference between the two sequential 
architectures is not significant (p=0.982). A half (56) of subjects spend more time in sequential 
elimination than in sequential tournament. Kendall’s coefficient of concordance for time spent in 
the three architectures is 0.754 (p<0.001), indicating that subjects who spend more time in one 
architecture tend to spend more time in all architectures.7 One must of course be careful in 
drawing a causal relationship between time spent and performance, especially across 
architectures. Spending more time may lead to better decisions or people may spend more time 
because they are making better decisions.8  
Table 2 ‐ Average Performance across Choice Architectures   
   Optimal Choice   Money Left on the Table  Decision Time 
Simultaneous choice  23%  0.14  89 
Sequential elimination  25%  0.14  124 
Sequential tournament  36%  0.12  142 
 
To understand the effect of both task and demographic characteristics on decision quality, 
we estimate a probit regression for optimal choice and an OLS regression for money left on the 
table. We have a total of 333 observations, 3 for each subject. We include demographic variables 
for age, sex, and dummies for educational attainment (some college and college graduate, with 
high school the omitted variable). We also include PDF and task order fixed effects (suppressed 
for brevity). Treatment dummy variables for the sequential choice architectures are included 
(with simultaneous choice as the omitted variable). We also report linear probability model 
estimates for optimal choice as the probit coefficients may suffer from the incidental parameter 
                                                            
7 The Spearman rank correlation between time in simultaneous and elimination architectures is 0.623 (p<0.001), 
while that between time in simultaneous and tournament is 0.726 (p<0.001). The rank correlation between the two 
sequential architectures is 0.544 (p<0.001). 
8 We have also looked at how demographic characteristics impact decision time, but do not find any statistically 
significant results. 
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problem since we are using a large number of fixed effects with what is effectively a short panel. 
However, our results are qualitatively unaffected by the choice of estimator.9 
Table 3 ‐ Factors Influencing Choice Quality 
Optimal Choice  Money Left  
Probit  LPM  on the Table 
Sequential elimination  0.108  0.030  ‐0.443 
(0.128)  (0.039)  (1.368) 
Sequential tournament  0.448***  0.141***  ‐2.164* 
(0.163)  (0.053)  (1.151) 
Age  ‐0.006  ‐0.002  0.061 
(0.006)  (0.002)  (0.049) 
Male dummy  ‐0.087  ‐0.022  2.167 
(0.202)  (0.065)  (1.690) 
Some college  0.678***  0.204***  ‐5.608*** 
(0.240)  (0.075)  (2.059) 
College/graduate  0.584**  0.173**  ‐5.892*** 
(0.253)  (0.079)  (1.890) 
Constant  ‐0.670*  0.265**  12.141*** 
   (0.392)  (0.123)  (3.275) 
Observations  333  333  333 
log likelihood  ‐184  ‐193  ‐1280 
(pseudo‐)R2  0.065  0.072  0.092 
Probit and linear probability model (LPM) coefficients reported for optimal choice, OLS for money left on the table. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. PDF and 
task order fixed effects included, but not reported. Money left on the table was measured on a 0‐100 scale. 
 
 Estimated coefficients in Table 3 confirm the relative performance results in Table 2. 
Sequential elimination does not lead to a significant improvement over simultaneous choice, 
while the sequential tournament architecture significantly improves the quality of choices, both 
in terms of increased frequency of optimal choice and reduced amount of money left on the 
table. Of the demographic variables, age and sex appear to play no role while education beyond 
high school is correlated with an estimated twenty percentage point increase in the chance of 
selecting the optimal option.10 The sequential tournament architecture leads to a predicted 
                                                            
9 Out of 333 possible predicted values, the linear probability model predicts three values outside the plausible 0–1 
range. This is not the case in the absence of fixed effects, which also does not affect our results in a qualitative way.   
10 To examine whether our difference in performance across choice architectures is driven by education, we 
analyzed these differences within each educational category. We find that a higher proportion of subjects select the 
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fourteen percentage point increase in optimal choice frequency relative to simultaneous choice, 
using either the LPM estimate or the probit marginal effects averaged across all subjects. 
Conversely, sequential elimination leads to no significant improvement.       
B. Choice Overload and the Status Quo Bias 
The choice overload hypothesis suggests that smaller choice sets can result in better decisions. In 
our experiment, each round in the sequential elimination and sequential tournament architectures 
involves a choice among only four options whereas the simultaneous decision architecture 
involves a choice among sixteen options. We first examine whether decision making is better in 
4-option choice sets than in 16-option ones in Table 4. Measures of optimal choice and money 
left on the table are relative to the set of options available in each round. Thus, for the 
simultaneous decision, these measures coincide with those in Table 3, but do not for the other 
two architectures. To avoid endogeneity issues, we again consider only the first three tasks, and 
exclude the fourth task in which subjects chose the choice architecture. The frequency of optimal 
choice when selecting among 16 options at once is only 23%, while the average across all rounds 
in sequential architectures is 47%. This is consistent with choice overload.  
Table 4 ‐ Round‐by‐Round Performance 
Task  Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice (16 options)  23%  0.14 
Sequential elimination (4 options)  46%  0.08 
Sequential tournament (4 options)  48%  0.08 
 
 Our results so far indicate decision making is better when fewer options are considered at 
once, but that the way a large set of options is broken into smaller parts matters for the quality of 
the final decision. Given this result, we try to understand why performance in the sequential 
tournament architecture is superior to performance in the sequential elimination architecture 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
optimal option under sequential tournament than under either of the other two architectures for each educational 
category.  
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even though both entail the same number of decisions over choice sets of the same size. We offer 
two possible explanations. 
First, we consider the possibility that subjects simply make independent errors in each 
round. These independent errors, even if equal across architectures, produce different rates of 
optimal choice among all sixteen options for the two sequential architectures. For a subject to 
select the optimal option in the sequential tournament architecture, she must select optimally in 
two rounds: the round in which the option first appears, and the final round. For the sequential 
elimination architecture, the subject must select optimally in the first round in which the optimal 
option appears, and in each subsequent round, if any. Statistically, this makes the chance of 
selecting the optimal option in the sequential tournament architecture higher or lower than in the 
sequential elimination architecture depending on the rate of optimal selection in each round.11 In 
our case, the 46% chance of selecting the best option in each round of sequential elimination 
would translate into a 16% overall chance of selecting the optimal option under the assumption 
of independent errors. For the sequential tournament architecture, the 48% in each round 
translates into a 23% of selecting the optimal option in the final round. The actual rates from 
Table 2 are substantially higher for both architectures, suggesting that simple independent error 
rates cannot fully explain our results.  
Second, we consider the possibility that errors are not independent across rounds due to 
the status quo bias. The selection of an option in one round may cause a subject to overvalue that 
same option in the next round, or to view selecting another option as a psychologically costly 
disaffirmation of their previous choice (Kahneman et al. 1991), or simply to prefer not to have to 
make another decision. Whatever its cause, sequential elimination may lay a trap for subjects 
susceptible to the status quo bias by carrying a selected option over to the next round. An error in 
selection in one round is likely to persist as the subject continues to select the same option in 
                                                            
11 Denote by p the probability of selecting the best option in each round. For the sequential tournament architecture, 
this translates into a probability of ultimately selecting the optimal option of p2. For the sequential elimination 
architecture, the probability that the optimal option appears in the first round is 4/16, and it is 3/16 for subsequent 
rounds. Thus, the probability of selecting the optimal option is ଷଵ଺ ݌ሺ1 ൅ ݌ ൅ ݌ଶ ൅ ݌ଷ ൅
ସ
ଷ ݌ସሻ. The sequential 
tournament architecture leads to a higher probability of selecting the optimal option whenever p>1/4.  
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subsequent rounds. Conversely, in the sequential tournament architecture, all options presented 
concurrently are on equal footing: either none has been previously considered or, in the final 
round, all have been selected in a previous round.  
We use McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model to estimate subject choices in each 
round as a function of two predictive variables: (i) the expected payoff, or expected probability 
of payment of each option, which proxies for optimal choice, and (ii) in the sequential 
elimination architecture, whether the option was selected in the previous round. Specifically, 
“Expected Payoff” is coded as the probability of payment, between zero and one. The “Selected 
Previous Round” dummy equals one for options in rounds two through five of the sequential 
elimination architecture that were selected in the previous round, and equals zero for all other 
options. We consider three subsets of data: decisions in each of the sequential architectures 
separately and pooled. Table 5 presents the estimates. 
Table 5 – Status Quo Bias  
Sequential Elimination  Sequential Tournament Pooled Sequential 
Expected Payoff          4.627***          5.324***         4.925*** 
(0.631)  (0.601)  (0.513) 
Selected Previous Round          0.459***          0.550*** 
(0.134)  (0.125) 
Observations (Options)  2,220  2,220  4,440 
Observations (Decisions)  111  111  222 
log likelihood  ‐687    ‐691    ‐1373 
Conditional logit coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level.  
 
The significance of expected payoff indicates that better options are selected with higher 
probability. The significance of selected previous round suggests that subjects exhibit the status 
quo bias in the sequential elimination tasks. Given the within-subject nature of our design, the 
consistency of the payoff heuristic across architectures is not surprising.12 Yet, when the status 
quo bias is provided an opportunity to manifest, subjects change their decision-making approach 
                                                            
12 We pool across both sequential architectures to show the consistency of the payoff variable. By the nature of the 
conditional logit estimator, separate regressions do not allow direct comparisons of parameters due to their 
confluence with potentially different variances. Confidence that these are similar is gained in column three which 
imposes identical variance on both.  
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to place additional reliance on the option previously selected. The relative parameter magnitudes 
indicate that the status quo bias is equivalent to approximately 10 (= 4.627/0.459) percentage 
points of the probability of payment. For example, a previously-selected option with a 70% 
chance of payment has a similar probability of being selected as a new option with an 80% 
chance of payment. Thus, in addition to any potential statistical disadvantage, sequential 
elimination allows the status quo bias to manifest. Subjects stick with options they selected, even 
if they are not optimal.  
C. Revealed Preferences for Choice Architecture 
Thus far, our results have focused on how the choice architecture impacts decision quality. We 
now examine which choice architecture subjects prefer according to their rankings of 
architectures, and how those revealed preferences correlate with the quality of their decisions. 
More than a half of our subjects, 59 out of 111, preferred the simultaneous choice architecture, 
while 29 (26%) preferred sequential elimination, and the remaining 23 (21%) preferred the 
sequential tournament. These preferences run opposite to the proportion of subjects selecting 
optimally under each architecture. The joint preference ranking of the least preferred choice 
architecture is almost a mirror image of the most preferred ranking. Just over a half of our 
subjects, 56, revealed sequential tournament as the least preferred architecture, followed by 30 
(27%) who rated sequential elimination as the least preferred, and 25 (23%) who rated 
simultaneous choice as the least preferred architecture. 
Given our procedure for eliciting rankings, subjects had a 2/3 chance of using their most 
preferred architecture for the fourth task and a 1/3 chance of using their second-most preferred 
architecture. Table 6 reports overall performance on the fourth task by choice architecture, and 
includes performance from the first three tasks in parentheses for comparison. Again, 
performance is best under the sequential tournament architecture despite the fact that it is the 
least preferred. Table 6 also reveals a suggestive pattern. While performance in both sequential 
architectures is better the second time it is used (in task 4), performance in the simultaneous 
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decision is actually worse the second time it is used than when it was first encountered. This 
suggests an adverse self-sorting in subjects’ preferences for the simultaneous choice architecture.  
Table 6 ‐ Performance on Task 4 (Average Performance on Tasks 1‐3) 
Task  Optimal Choice  Money Left on the Table 
Simultaneous choice (N=53)  15%  (23%)  0.15  (0.14) 
Sequential elimination (N=33)  27%  (25%)  0.11  (0.14) 
Sequential tournament (N=25)  40%  (36%)   0.08  (0.12) 
 
  To explore the possibility of adverse self-sorting, we investigate the frequency with 
which subjects prefer the choice architecture under which they performed best initially. We focus 
on subjects whose performance under one architecture was strictly better than under the other 
two. For this purpose, we say a subject performed unambiguously best in a particular choice 
architecture if the rank of the selected option is higher in that architecture than in the other two.13 
If a subject did equally well under two procedures then no unambiguously best architecture is 
identified. The data are tabulated in Table 7. 
Table 7 – Unambiguously Best Architecture Performance and Architecture Preferences 
Most preferred architecture 
Unambiguously Best Architecture 
Simultaneous 
choice 
Sequential 
elimination 
Sequential 
tournament 
Simultaneous choice (N=21)  62%  14%  24% 
Sequential elimination (N=22)  36%  50%  14% 
Sequential tournament (N=30)  73%  10%  17% 
None (N=38)  42%  32%  26% 
 
 If subjects’ preferences over choice architecture were associated with how well they 
performed in each, entries should fall along the diagonal in Table 7. Twenty-one subjects did 
best in simultaneous choice, of which 62% identified it as their most preferred architecture. Of 
the 22 subjects who did best in sequential elimination, 50% identified it as their most preferred 
procedure. The most surprising results are for those who do best in the sequential tournament. Of 
                                                            
13 We obtain the same qualitative results if we consider only subjects who chose optimally under exactly one 
mechanism or by defining “unambiguously best” based on which architecture yielded the highest expected payoff or 
lowest amount of money left on the table. The challenge with the latter two definitions is that ordinally equivalent 
choices lead to different payoffs due to slight variations across PDFs by design.  
18 
 
the 30 subjects who did best in sequential tournament, only 17% identified it as their most 
preferred architecture while 73% preferred simultaneous choice. This means that individuals who 
perform best in sequential tournament are more likely to prefer simultaneous choice than those 
who actually performed best in simultaneous choice. The 38 subjects for whom no 
unambiguously best architecture is identified exhibit a similar adverse self-sorting. While a 
plurality of these subjects prefer simultaneous choice, 85% do at least as well under the 
sequential tournament architecture. 
There are several potential reasons for subjects’ selecting an architecture that does not 
lead to the best choice. We first consider that subjects may be making a rational choice that 
trades off the costs of a suboptimal architecture against its perceived benefits. Specifically, we 
noted above that the simultaneous choice architecture takes less time than the sequential 
architectures. This is not due to any technological differences as one could navigate through the 
sequential decision screens in a mere couple of seconds. Instead, as noted by Payne et al. (1993), 
this is likely the result of an accuracy-effort tradeoff. The more complex choice inherent in the 
simultaneous architecture likely leads to the adoption of simpler decision rules that require less 
effort to implement but also lead to less accurate decisions. The choice of architecture then may 
imply a second effort-accuracy tradeoff between the simultaneous architecture (in which subjects 
elect to spend less time at the expense of accuracy) and one of the sequential architectures (in 
which subjects elect to spend more time and enjoy better accuracy). Such a tradeoff would 
suggest that subjects are more likely to prefer an architecture if its relative performance is better 
and if its relative time is shorter.  
We examine this possibility in Table 8. We measure for each subject the ratio of time 
spent on the sequential tournament architecture to time spent on the simultaneous architecture 
and examine architecture preferences by performance and whether the ratio of time is above or 
below the median. The table indicates that relative time spent on simultaneous versus sequential 
tournament architectures is not predictive of architecture preference. Among subjects who do 
unambiguously best under the sequential tournament architecture, a vast majority prefer the 
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simultaneous architecture independent of relative time.14 These results suggest that time, at least, 
does not strongly enter into subjects’ preferences over architecture.  
Table 8 –Architecture Performance, Time, and Architecture Preferences 
    Most preferred architecture 
Relative 
time   Unambiguously Best Architecture
Simultaneous 
choice
Sequential 
tournament 
Below 
median 
Simultaneous choice (N=12)  67%  17% 
Sequential tournament (N=17)  71%  18% 
 
Above 
median 
Simultaneous choice (N=9)  55%  33% 
Sequential tournament (N=13)  77%  15% 
Relative time = time on sequential tournament / time on simultaneous 
 
Aside from time, simultaneous choice may also be less effortful and therefore heavily 
preferred precisely because it entails making only one decision while both sequential 
architectures require more cognitive effort as they entail five decisions. Further, the sequential 
tournament may be considered more psychologically discomforting because it requires five 
active decisions. In contrast, sequential elimination allows for a subject to make one active 
decision in the first round and simply stick with that choice in every subsequent round. That is, 
the status quo bias may be a rational response to decision costs. As anticipated cognitive 
demands play an important role in decision making (Kool et al.  2010), subjects may be willing 
to accept a less optimal outcome in exchange for less cognitive effort.  
However, if the simultaneous architecture is inherently least effortful (whether in terms 
of time or psychological costs), then this can only explain a general preference for it. It cannot 
explain why we observe reverse sorting, by which subjects who do best in sequential tournament 
are even more likely to prefer simultaneous choice than those who did best in simultaneous 
choice architecture. Therefore, subject preferences do not seem to reflect only a simple tradeoff 
between accuracy and effort. Instead, it is entirely possible that subjects are not good at 
evaluating the quality of their decisions and thus err in selecting an architecture. Whatever the 
                                                            
14 We conduct the same analysis using the difference in time between the two mechanisms rather than the ratio of 
time and obtain the same qualitative results. 
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cause, the key insight is that subjects are unlikely to select the architecture that leads to the best 
choice. 
IV. Conclusions 
By now, several studies have suggested that increased choice may not be beneficial to decision 
makers. Despite the greater likelihood of a better option being available, a larger number of 
choices may lead to choice overload, greater regret, and more indecision. This has led some to 
suggest that choice sets should be restricted (Schwartz 2005). From a practical standpoint, all 
proposals calling for restricting a choice set face the criticism of being paternalistic in 
determining how choices are restricted.   
Instead of attempting to restrict the choice set, we seek to identify whether restructuring 
choice architectures can enhance decision quality while still maintaining the size of the choice 
set. Consistent with previous work, we find that decision making improves when fewer options 
are considered concurrently. Thus, our focus is on two sequential processes that break a decision 
into a series of choices, each among a small number of options. The intuitive and commonly 
suggested sequential elimination approach appears to encourage a suboptimal heuristic. When a 
previously-selected option is compared to a new subset of options, subjects exhibit a status quo 
bias which causes them to undervalue new options.   
 The sequential tournament process does succeed in improving the quality of decision 
making in our setting. This choice architecture first places options into subgroups and then the 
options selected from each subgroup are combined into a final set from which the ultimate 
decision is made. It captures the advantage of a small choice set for each decision while avoiding 
the effects of the status quo bias.  
 In the aggregate, while subjects can benefit from alternative choice architectures, there is 
a negative correlation between architecture performance and architecture preference. We find 
evidence of adverse self-sorting with subjects preferring choice architectures in which they did 
not have their best performance. The performance of these architectures in the “real world” 
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might vary greatly from our highly stylized environment. However, our results suggest that 
simply letting people select a choice architecture may be insufficient to facilitate improved 
decision making.   
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue for “libertarian paternalism,” a decision-making 
intervention in which choice architectures direct individuals towards certain choices while 
maintaining the opportunity to select among the full range of options. For example, Sethi-
Iyengar et al. (2004) suggest that people should initially be presented with only a few options 
while retaining the ability to consider a larger set of options if they so choose. The desirability of 
such a choice architecture inherently assumes that adverse self-sorting is not a problem and that 
only the right people expand the choice set. Specifically, for such an architecture to improve 
choice quality, preferences over choice set size and performance under different choice set sizes 
need to correspond.  
Our findings essentially push the paternalistic discussion associated with choice overload 
back one level. Our work suggests that more, but not all, people would select better options with 
a sequential tournament; however, this choice architecture may be the least preferred of those we 
consider.  Therefore, in some cases, policy makers or others designing a choice problem may 
wish to impose an unpopular procedure in order to improve decision making quality. Clearly, the 
appropriateness of such libertarian paternalism needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.      
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